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PHILOSOPHY VINDICATED
BY CLARENCE ERICKSON
IT has become the custom of late years to Uken philosophy to the
search in a pitch-dark room for a black cat that, after all, does
not really exist. Philosophy is often considered a curious species
of Solitaire, in which such terms as "substance," "mode," "percept,"
"concept," "matter," and "spirit" are manipulated about to beguile
the excess leisure of a muscle-bound intellect, rendered unfit to
participate on the battle-ground of the world of action by too great
subtlety and over-sensitivity.
Philosophy, say its detractors, is a now abandoned method of
searching for truth, by means of speculation and ingenious spinning
out of words, which has been supplanted by science, which gets at,
and observes the "facts." Like religion, philosophy is held to repre-
sent and immature stage in the evolution of human intelligence, and
to be now well-nigh obsolete among enlightened people. Ikit old
superstitions die hard ; millions of people still belong to the churches,
and a few living fossils of academic erudition still cultivate
philosophy.
Such is the attitude of a certain superior class of persons toward
philosophy: a class that has just been emancipated from the medi-
aeval superstitions of Fundamentalism, and, like a delighted child,
is trying out its newly acquired wings of intellectual freedom in
flights of polite heresy ; a class that has been newly converted from
the Babbitry of Dr. Frank Crane to the Babbitry of H. L. Mencken
;
a class that rejects the fallacious creed of the ignorant majoritv only
to embrace the liberal dogma of the enlightened minorit\' that reads
the American Mercury. M. L. Mencken in an editorial of his makes
some caustic jibes at philosophy, and forever afterwards the Ameri-
can Alercury reading public, the class that has been freed' from
intellectual dictatorship and now does its own thinking, goes about
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repeating parrot-like the gospel of our lord, H. L. Alencken.
The chief reason for this widespread disdain of philosophy is
the popular acceptance of materialism, which is commonly supposed
to be identical w^ith science, and to have rendered philosophy no
longer necessary. But in reality, materialism, far from being science
itself, is only a philosophical inference drawn from some of the
results of science. Far from having supplanted philosophy, material-
ism is itself a philosophy.
Alaterialism had a large following in learned circles during the
latter half of last centur}-. Its votaries were principally men of
science, with no genuine philosophical training, suddenly turned into
philosophers through whim. The works of these amateur philoso-
phers are full of crudities and self-contradictions, but the}- are com-
parativel}' eas}- to read and fascinating in their naive simplicit}',
which accounts for their vogue among the uninitiated. Like all doc-
trines that have had to fight their way into favor, materialism is only
now winning a popular acceptance, long after it has been left behind
in philosophical circles.
[Materialism is based on the unwarranted assumption that thei-e
is only one science of nature, the science of mechanics. All the other
sciences, such as chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, are con-
sidered more complicated phases of mechanics. The ideal towards
which materialism strives is the ultimate explanation of all phenom-
ena, whether chemical, biological, or psychical, in terms of motions
of indivisible unit particles of matter. Nothing is said to exist but
matter in the form of atoms, and the motions of these atoms. If
the position of every particle in the universe together with the
direction and the velocity of its motion were known, it would be
possible to reconstruct the past history and to predict the future of
the universe down to the smallest detail. A hypothetical all-knowing
mind, from the positions and velocities of the particles of the
primeval nebula from which the solar system evolved, could have
deduced, by mathematical calculation, the future history of the
earth down to every word of Homer, every chord of Beethoven,
every formula of Einstein, every nuance of Fritz Kreisler. This is
the logical corollary of materialism. Such is the miracle the skeptics
so piously believe.
This exaltation of mechanics into the one master science is the
outcome of the magnificent results the physics of Kepler, Galileo,
and Xewton yielded in reducing the motions of the planets to infal-
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lible law and order. At one time geometry was considered the fun-
damental science, and Plato had the motto, "Let no one ignorant of
geometry enter here," placed over the entrance to his academy. The
present enthusiasm for mechanics is a mere fad, which will pass like
the former enthusiasm for geometry.
As a matter of fact, there are at least five fundamental sciences
of reality; Physics (Mechanics), Chemistry, Biology, Psychology,
and Sociology, each succeeding science treating of a new and higher
order of reality, which could not be treated by the preceding sciences.
The simplest fact of chemistry cannot be explained in terms of
mechanics. When two atoms of hydrogen combine with one atom
of oxygen, the product, water, has cjualities and properties which
could not have been predicted from our knowledge of the properties
of ox}gen and hydrogen. Or, carrying the example out to its ideal
limits, if every electron and proton, their positions, velocities, and
masses were known in the reaction, if we had no previous experience
of water, we should be unable to predict the result of the reaction.
If the mechanistic hypothesis is inadequate to account for the
sim{:)lest chemical reaction, how much more far-fetched is the at-
tempt to reduce the phenomena of biology, or even psycholog}', to
mechanics.
The term materialist, or mechanist, is sometimes improperly
applied to those scientists who would reduce biology and the higher
sciences to organic chemistry. ]\Iuch has been done in the field of
Bio-chemistry, as it is called, but the knowledge of the chemistry of
living organisms by no means exhausts the science of biology.
Bio-chemistry and biology represent two difl^erent viewpoints from
which the same set of phenomena may be studied, and each uses a
different set of concepts. Bio-chemistry is based on the concepts of
atomic and molecular proportions, transformations of chemical
energy, etc. ; biology is grounded on the concepts of life, growth,
development, and evolution. The latter set of concepts cannot be
reduced to the former; they are supplementary, not higher or lower
terms of the same thing.
The phenomena of life involve complicated chemical processes
it is true, but new qualities, biological qualities, emerge from the
aggregate of chemical qualities which a knowledge of the latter alone
would never reveal. In the same way, in our previous example of
the chemistry of water, new qualities, of the chemical order, emerge
from the aggregate of physical qualities of hydrogen and oxygen.
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This doctrine of emerg-ence is one of the most generally accepted
of the philosophical tendencies of the present day. It may be ab-
stractly stated thus : Aggregates have properties which are more
than, and cannot be predicted from, the sum of their constituent
parts.
Each succeeding science in the hierarchy of fundamental sciences,
physics, chemistrv, biology, psychology, sociology, deals with a
higher order of emergent qualities than the science immediately
preceding it. The realm of inert, dead, mechanical law emerges
from '"events" in the space-time manifold. The chemical order of
reality emerges from the mechanical order. When the phenomena
of chemistry become sufficientl}' complex a new order of realit}-,
called life, emerges. ]\Iind emerges from life, and the phenomena of
societ}' emerge from aggregates of minds.
It is thus seen that the fundamental axiom of materialism, that
all phenomena can ultimately be explained in terms of mechanics,
or in terms of physics and chemistry, is a mistaken dogma, as fal-
lacious as the dogmas of mediaeval theology.
^Materialism also meets insuperable difficulties in its treatment
of the mind and body problem. In keeping with its fundamental
postulate, that the one reality is matter, materialism attempts to re-
duce mind to body. Mind is explained as the functioning of matter
of especially complex organization, namely, brain and nerve tissue.
Consciousness is an accidental something accompanying these com-
plex material phenomena in the brain, much the same as an acci-
dental humming sound accompanies the operation of complex ma-
chinery. Consciousness is without utility of any sort, a mere epi-
phenomenon accompanying brain and nerve processes.
If this view is correct, the plays of Shakespeare, the music-
dramas of Wagner, the paintings of Alichaelangelo, might equally
well have been produced and appreciated by a race of unconscious
automatons, since consciousness has no effect on our conduct and
is a mere accidental spectator enjoying (or lamenting) the mechani-
cally determined operations of our body-machines.
Recent developments in the physical sciences, which formerly
were the chief prop of materialism, have tended to discredit ma-
terialism. The materiality of the once dreaded "matter"—that ob-
ject of the invectives of theologians and the spiritually inclined
—
has been impeached by recent researches into the nature of the
electron. The electron, the ultimate unit of matter, has been reduced
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to a mere centre of reference, from which radiations emanate at
certain intervals, and since the electrons are known to us only
through these intermittent radiations we are unjustified in attribut-
ing to them the properties of "matter" as common-sense conceives
that term. From a strictl}- empirical stand-point, all that can be
said of a piece of matter is that it consists of a series of "events"
in the space-time manifold, having a more or less persisting identity.
The definition which defines matter as "nothing in motion" is more
than a witticism. Physical science is becoming more and more
ghostly and spiritual, and the former hard, impenetrable ultimate
particles of matter are now immaterial centres of force. There is
no longer any absurdity in supposing these centres of force to be
psychical in nature, the expression, mayhap, of nescient will or intel-
ligence. A\'hile psychology, under the influence of behaviorism, is
becoming materialistic, physics is fast approaching panpsychism
!
Materialism being thus archaic and inadequate, the problems of
philosophy are not mere hallucinations, and philosophy is as real
and valid a discipline as ever.
But despite the fact that materialism is dead among philosophers,
it is gaining multitudes of converts, especially among the younger
generation. The reasons for this growth of materialism are its
attractive extremism ; its appealing, but specious, simplicity : the
gradual extinction of Christianity ; its ethical indifference, which
condones an empty life of frivolous pleasure seeking; and above all,
the appalling and almost universal ignorance of philosophy.
The Fundamentalist Christianity of the older generation is losing
ground rapidl}-, and after a few more pyrrhic victories, such as that
of the Tennessee evolution trial, will be well nigh extinct. ]\Iodern-
ism has not been able to repair the breach in the dam of faith left
by Fundamentalism crumbling before the debacle of modern en-
lightenment. Supernaturalism, with good old-fashioned miracles
and hell-fire, is the very life and blood of popular religion, and for
that reason Modernism makes little appeal. The unenlightened per-
son wants a religion of the old brand, with a heaven to reward the
virtuous and downtrodden, and a hell to punish the sinful and
prosperous, or else he had rather not bother wuth religion at all. The
person with sufficient intelligence to get along without a future
heaven and hell is not attracted by pale, anemic Modernism, which
appears to him to be nothing but words, cleverly juggled so as to
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reconcile science and theology. The widespread ignorance of philos-
oj)h\- leaves no alternative but materialism, in either case, f lence it
is not surprising that materialism is succeeding decaying funda-
mentalism.
The passing of the old religions will leave the world as dogmatic
as ever. The dogmatism of materialism will have become substituted
for the dogmatism of Christianity, and new philosophical ideas will
meet the same hostile reception as of old. The onl_\- solution of the
difficult\- lies in a more widespread study of philosoph}-.
( )ne of the chief enemies with which philosoph}' has to contend
is a complete and almost uni\ersal misapprehension of the problems,
scope, and tield of philosophy, and its relations to the other branches
of human knowledge.
It is popularl}- and erroneously believed that science—that is.
observation and experiment—has superseded and put into discard
philosophy—that is, loose, unverified speculation. A certain superior
class of hack writers, who st_\le themselves "scientific," because the\
have read and half-understood a few unauthoritative, popular books
on science, are fond of alluding to the misguided efforts of certain
medieval, theological philosophers, and placing a stigma upon all
philosophical activity in consequence.
The question of how many teeth a horse has became a subject of
debate at some time during the Aliddle Ages, and a group of worth\-
Schoolmen wasted an astonishing amount of brain tissue, ink and
paper, breath, and ill temper without arriving at an agreement. It
never occurred to these Scholastics to get a real, living specimen of
a horse, open his mouth, and count his teeth. The pseudo-scientific
writers mentioned above regale the magazine-reading public with
this delectable stor}-, and then, fearing that the point will be missed,
proceed to give the reader a good dose of moral, in the shape of the
conclusion that philosophy is obsolete, and has been superseded b\-
science.
There are several errors in this specious moral. In the first
])lace. the Schoolmen of the ]^Iiddle Ages were theologians rather
than philosophers, and all their so-called philosophizing was obliged
to arrive at pre-ordained conclusions fixed b}' the authority of the
Church militant. Scholastic reasoning was the process of finding
new proofs for old "truths,"' fixed b}' authorit}-. not the process of
arriving at new truths. In the second place, the mistakes of indi-
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vidual philosophers do not invahdate philosophy as a whole. Scien-
tists also have often made mistakes, but no one outside of Billy
Sunday or John Roach Straton would hold that these acknowledged
errors constitute a refutation of science.
A misapprehension of what philosophy really is lies at the bottom
of these attempts to ridicule philosophy.
We shall now attempt to arrive at a more exact idea of what
philosophy really is. The successful defining of philosophy consti-
tutes perhaps the most difficult problem of philosophy. A fair sized
volume could be filled with various definitions which have been tried
and found inadequate during the history of philosophic thought.
The reason for the difficulty, nay, impossibility, of defining
philosophy has been aptly summed up by Hegel, who said that
philosoph}' cannot be defined since it defines all else. A definition
of philosophy in one sentence must be given up as an impossible
undertaking, so we shall attempt to define philosophy by pointing out
a few of its more salient tasks.
The principal aim of philosophy is to arrive at a unified concep-
tion of the universe, a Wcltanschauung, or world-view, through a
critical and s}'nthetic examination of all the humanly possible ways
of knowing reality.
These modes of knowing are Common Sense, Religion, Art, and
Science, each of which represents a distinct and peculiar view-point,
in accordance with which the multiplicity of phenomena is in-
terpreted. Common sense looks at things from the undisciplined
point of view of the man on the street. Religion attempts to formu-
late the individual's emotional relationship, and moral responsibility
to the Invisible Power behind the universe. Art interprets reality
in terms of beauty, and hence is more or less subjective and capable
of an infinite variety of forms. Science describes the universe in
terms of mechanism, and lays bare the mechanical means through
which the cosmic purposes are realized. In other words, science
studies the technique of the Composer of the cosmic symphony.
The function of metaphysics, the central discipline of philosophy,
is to construct a dispassionate, composite view of reality, from all
that it finds valid in the claims of common sense, religion, art,
and science. Such a broad, unprejudiced, synthetic attitude toward
the cosmos constitutes one's Weltanschauung.
It frequently happens that conflicts occur between common
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sense, religion, art, and science. But such clashes are due to
ignorance of the proper sphere of each of these apparently contend-
ing points of view; in other words, an ignorance of philosophy.
Take science and religion for example. Religion has often
attempted to do the work that legitimately belongs to science, as
in the Book of Genesis in the Bible, where a would-be scientific ex-
planation of the origin of things is given. Because of such en-
croachments of religion upon the domain of science, incessant war-
fare has been waged between these two rivals since the beginning of
human thought, and continues to-day in the invectives of theologians
against evolution. The so-called conflict between science and re-
ligion is in reality a conflict between the three thousand year old
science of Aloses and modern science.
Now there could be no conflict between a rational religion, based
upon a study of philosophy, not spurious revelation, and science.
Each represents a different "universe of discourse." Science can no
more invalidate the religion of a philosopher than a knowledge of the
number of words, the kind of type, or the grade of paper used in
the printing of Hamlet can invalidate the lofty strength, truth, and
beauty of Shakespeare's immortal lines.
In this connection, there is an interesting story on record of a
certain natural mathematician, who could do unheard of problems.
such as cube roots and adding whole pages of figures, mentally.
Once out of curiosity, a group of this extraordinary man's friends
took him to see a performance of Hamlet, to see what his reaction
would be. The looked for reaction was most curious : the mental
mathematician stated the exact number of syllables, words, and
speeches in the play, but was totally unable to recount the story,
meaning, philosoph}-, or any of the aesthetic qualities of Hamlet.
Here we have a splendid example of the study of the identical
subject-matter from more than one view-point, each of which be-
longs to a different universe of discourse, and hence does not in the
least impinge upon, or invalidate, the other view-points. The mathe-
matician studied Hamlet from a mathematical point of view, and
arrived at purely quantitative results. A literary student, seeing the
same production of Hamlet, might have gained a comprehensive view
of Shakespeare's philosophy of life. Still another auditor might
have studied the play from the viewpoint of grammar, and com-
pared the grammar of Shakespeare with the grammar of to-day.
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These three methods of studying Hamlet give us three sets of
resuhs not at ah like one another. But no one would sa_\- that these
different results contradict one another. The number of words in
Hamlet has no bearing upon Shakespeare's grammatical usages, or
upon the ethical implications of Hamlet's soliloquy.
Similarl}', the universe may be studied from the viewpoints of
common sense, art, religion, science, and philosoph\- without an}'
contradiction ensuing, because the results of these various view-
points are incommensurable with one another and belong to different
universes of discourse.
Hence, the world-views given us by common sense, art, religion,
science, and philosophy are equally valid, provided that they do not
mistake their proper places, and do not encroach upon territorx'
properly belonging to the others, as has so often happened in the
past, through ignorance of philosophy. But it is to the world-view
of philosophy that the greatest credence must be given, since, as
we have seen, philosophy is a synthesis based upon an examination
of all means of attaining knowledge.
It is sometimes erroneously held by the philosophically illiterate
enemies of philosophy that philosophy is in conflict with science.
Such cannot be the case, for philosophy draws part of its data from
the results of science. There may indeed be conflict between mate-
rialism and other schools of philosophy, but, as we have seen, ma-
terialism is not science itself, but merely one of the possible philo-
sophical interpretations of science.
Philosophy supplements, does not contradict science. One is
philosophical after one has been scientific. Herbert Spencer said,
"Knowledge of the lowest kind is un-unificd knozvledge : Science is
partially-unified knozvlcdye ; Philosophy is completely-unified knozvl-
edge." ( First Principles, page 119. ) That is, common sense knowl-
edge consists of scattered, isolated maxims and rules not yet re-
duced to a system b\' classification under general principles. Scien-
tific knowledge consists of general theories and principles unifying
one particular science, for example, as the atomic theory unifies
chemistry, or the evolution theory, biology. According to Spencer,
a philosophical generalization is one that involves the complete body
of science as a whole. We should prefer, however, to give the
term "philosophical" a broader application, and extend it to cover all
possible knowledge, not merely scientific knowledge.
Properly speaking, that branch of philosophy which deals with
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the results of science, is Natural Philosophy. The tasks of philos-
oph\' in connection with science consist in the analysis of the axioms
and unanal} zed fundamental concepts of the special sciences ; the
examination and possible improvement of the methods and pro-
cedures of science; and the extension of broad, general scientific
theories, such as the evolution theory, to all departments of human
knowledge.
Each of the empirical sciences is based upon certain basic con-
cepts, in terms of which the subject-matter of the particular science
is described. The physical sciences, for example, are built upon the
concepts of matter, ciicri/y. space, ti)iie. and motion. These terms
are taken for granted, and physics makes no attempt to tell us what
the\- really are.
It is through the identification of these terms with the significance
common sense has attached to them that mistaken philosophical in-
terpretations arise. For example, the matter of phx'sics is confused
with the hard, enduring, impenetrable matter of our dail_\' experience.
In realit}'. the term matter as used in science is a mere abstraction,
a short-hand expression b_\' which we express the idea that certain
groups of sensible properties of our experience always occur to-
gether and maintain a persisting identity. This confusion of the
scientific and common sense meanings of the word "matter" is one
of the root fallacies of materialism.
Similarly, the phenomena of biology are described in terms of
life, striieture. function, dez'elopmcnt, ei'ohition, etc. The subiect-
matter of psychology is reduced to the fundamental concepts of
sensation, perception, coi/nition. affection, volition, etc., or, in the
psychology of John C. AA'atson and the behaviorists. merely stimulus
and response.
It is one of the tasks of natural philosophy to define and analyze
these elementary concepts, such as matter, energy, ei'olution, per-
ception. If philosophy were more widel_\- studied there would be
fewer faulty interpretations of the axioms of science, and less
credence given to the ridiculous philosophizings of scientific special-
ists suddenly turned philosophers for the sake of publicity.
One of the chief tasks of natural philosophy is the application of
certain far-reaching scientific to the entire body of human knowl-
edge. The theory of evolution is such a theory. Every art, e\ery
science, literature, practically every pursuit of man, no matter how
far removed from the field of biology, has been profoundly affected
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by this revolutionizing and epoch-making conception. It is obvious
that no one of the special sciences is general enough in its scope to
undertake the task of tracing all the manifold implications of the
theory of evolution. Hence this work must be undertaken by
philosophy.
Another task which falls to the philosopher is the unifying of
the results of the separate special sciences into an organic whole.
This is an age of extreme specialization, and the workers in the
different fields of scientific research are getting more and more out
of touch with one another, so that were it not for the synthesizing
activity of philosophy, chaos would inevitably result and science
would degenerate into an unorganized, unconnected congeries of
random facts and details.
It has been protested that this labor of unifying the sciences is
no longer practicable for the philosopher. It is said that the results
of the various sciences now form a body so inconceivably vast that
no one man could hope to master it all in a lifetime.
But it is not necessary to know every particular fact in all the
sciences to build up a philosophy of science. A knowledge of the
principles, general laws, methods, and basic concepts is all that is
requisite, the mass of details being irrelevant. The mastering of
the fundamental principles of the sciences surely is not the work of
a lifetime. Hence, Spencer's conception of philosophy as a com-
pletely unified universal science is still valid, except that he should
have used the more restrictive term, "natural philosophy."
In addition to metaphysics and natural philosophy, which we
have already examined, philosophy includes several other disciplines.
The most important of these are Epistemology, Aesthetics, and
Ethics. Lack of space obliges us to dismiss each of these with a
word. Epistemology investigates the conditions, possibility, and
validity of human knowledge. Aesthetics treats of the problems of
beauty, taste, and artistic norms. Ethics studies the principles un-
derlying moral conduct.
It is evident that these subjects are not capable of being subjected
to exact scientific treatment. Hence, philosophy is necessar}- for
their study, if for no other reason.
Philosophy is sometimes impugned on the ground that the only
certain knowledge is the knowledge given us by the sciences, and
that philosophy is the work of fancy and unbridled imagination in
a sphere where the truth is not vouchsafed to human intelligence.
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This attitude is known as positiz-isiii and is not to be confused with
materiahsm. Materialism dogmatically asserts that there is no other
reality than mass particles in motion. Positivism does not deny the
possible existence of an underlying reality of which the world of
mass particles in motion is only a manifestation. It merely says that
knowledge of this underlying reality is impossible to human minds,
and that our efforts should be confined to the less pretentious, but
practical field of science.
Positivism is usually associated with the name of Auguste Comte,
the French philosopher of the first half of the eighteenth centur^-,
who called his system the Philosophie Positive. Comte banished
metaphysics from his philosophy and concerned himself entirelv with
the "positive" results of the empirical sciences. Within the field of
science itself, Comte recommended complete reliance upon observa-
tion, and the exclusion of all speculation that might be of a meta-
physical nature.
The result of this dread of the bogey of metaphysics was that
Comte relegated so many problems of science and philosophy to the
category of the "unknowable" that, had men of science followed his
teachings, science would have stopped in its progress then and there
and advanced no further. The nature of light, the chemical composi-
tion of the sun and the stars, the ultimate nature of matter, said
Comte, were to be given up b\- science as problems incapable of so-
lution b}- human intelligence, and scientists who dealt with them
were wasting their time pursuing metaphysical will-o'-the-wisps.
Fortunately, men of science pursued these "\vill-o'-the-wis])s"
despite the warnings of the positivists, and ever\' High School child
now knows, or should know, that light consists of inconceivabh'
rapid vibrations of what was once called the ether, that matter is
composed of electrons and protons, and that the chemical element
Helium was discovered in the sun even before it was found on the
earth.
It will be readily seen that an over-emphasis upon mere observa-
tion to the exclusion of speculation, or imagination, in science is as
fatal to progress as pure, unverified speculation. Scientific dis-
coveries are made, not by the application of hard and fast rules of
experimental procedure, but by employing the imagination in fram-
ing ingenious hypotheses, which are tried out in actual experience to
see if they will work. Imagination, trial and error, even "meta-
physical" speculation, are indispensible in giving the scientist his
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first guesses and crude hypotheses, to be refined later, through suc-
cesive modifications and verifications, into accurate laws and theories
rich in practical results to mankind.
Speculation, in other words philosophy, is an indispensible part
of scientific method. Pure observation and experiment, or em-
piricism, is as useless as pure, untested speculation, or rationalism.
Throughout the ages, these two motives, the rationalistic and the
empirical, have existed side by side, apparently incompatible with
^ach other. The reason why science and philosophy were so slow in
arriving at lasting and substantial results is that a happy balance
between the two irreconcilables, rationalism and empiricism, had not
been attained.
For the scientific method is really nothing less, nothing more,
than the harnessing of the two incompatible steeds to a common
purpose. Leonardo da \'inci, Galileo, and Descartes ( not Bacon as
is commonly supposed ) developed the characteristic, wonderfully
productive scientific method, and each of the three was even more
a philosopher than a scientist. Galileo in his writings mentions that
he had studied philosophy as many years as he had studied months
of science and mathematics, and this statement is significant. For
the devising of the methods of science is a task involving deep
thought and philosophw F"ortunately, Leonardo and Galileo tested
'ne efficiency of their methods by actual observation, and modern
science was born.
Science is rational-empiricism. Science is the base metal, found
bv empiricism, transmuted b}' the touchstone of rationalism into pure
gold.
The atomic theory of Dalton, which put chemistry upon a solid
foundation ; the evolution theory of Lamarck and Darwin, which has
enriched not only biology, but the whole of human thought ; wdiat
are they but philosophical theories, verified by their magnificent
results? For who has seen, or ever will see, an atom? Who has
ever. seen one species turn into another? These two theories are the
work of speculation, rationalism, philosophy, and not observation.
Philosophy thus plays an indispensible part in science itself.
Without "metaphysical" speculation the progress of science would
immediately cease, ^^'ithout philosophy, the methods of science
would never have come into being.
Far from philosophy having no place in science, science, whether
it acknowledge it or not, assumes a metaphysical attitude in every
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formula, e\er\- law, ever}- generalization. This metaphysical attitude
amounts to a matter of faith, and is the very apostle's creed of
science, without which science would be as helpless as the h\inda-
mentalist who had just lost his faith.
Science assumes as a working hypothesis, as a sacred article of
faith, that the same cause must always be followed by the same
etTect. liut from a purel}' empirical-skeptical stand])oint there is no
comitulsion in causal relationships. All that can be i)redicated of
the recurrence of phenomena is probability, not certainty, that the
same elTect will follow the same cause. Scientific laws and formulae
are but "short-hand descriptions" ( Karl I'earson, Groniiiiar of
Science ) of certain regularities and uniformities in the tiux of
perceptual experience.
The practical applications of science, control of the forces of
nature, the a])plication of mechanical laws to machines, assiiiuc
that the same effect must follow the same cause.
\\'hen (Icorge Babbit steps on the starter of his h'ord. he has
faith that a sequence of phenomena of electricit}', dynamics, me-
chanics, compression and expansion of gases, and centrifugal force
w ill occur that will enable to get to his destination on time. A\'hen a
lady dri\-er stops suddenly in front of him, he trusts that the
mathematical and mechanical laws under which his brakes operate
will hold good in this particular instance as the}' have in all observed
instances in the past, provided the mechanism is in working order.
The sun has been observed to rise ( apparently ) in the east and
set in the west in all recorded instances in the past; hence it is
extreniel}- probable that it will rise in the east and set in the west
to-morrow. I Jut the proposition that the sun must inevitably rise in
the east and set in the west to-morrow is incapable of logical proof.
-Nil that we can sa}- with the authority of logic is that it is ver\-
likel}- that no exception to the rule will occur to-morrow.
There is no compulsion in the passing of one phenomenon into
another, a cause into its effect. All reference to a causal force or
agenc}- that brings about the effect, that makes the cause a cause,
is a matter for metaphysics, not for science. We assume as a work-
ing h}pothesis, "same cause, same effect." Scientists are willing to
stake ever}thing on this creed, and it constitutes their gospel.
If a metaphysical assumption, an article of faith, is necessary for
science, the pursuit of life even more urgentl}- demands a working
h}pothcsis, a philosophy, some sort of creed. Indeed, the most
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practical benefit of philosophy, the point of contact between philos-
ophy and average human being, lies in its supplying the individual,
and the age in which he lives, with an attitude toward life and the
universe that will serve as the basis of his conduct.
It may be true that such an attitude toward things in\olves
beliefs incapable of proof, faith, and a measure of dogmatism. But
a certain degree of dogmatic self-assurance is necessary for success-
ful living. Hamlet is a classic example of a man so undogmatic, so
open-minded, that all action is suspended in favor of self-scrutiny,
and the neutralizing influence of conflicting arguments. Hesitation,
indecision, impotence, and suspended animation are the results of a
too thorough-going open-mindedness.
We may concede, then, the need for a modicum of dogmatism,
or faith, in a philosophy of life that is to carry conviction and which
is to be capable of functioning.
Even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that the cause and
purpose of existence is unknowable to human intelligence, still our
minds demand that we adopt some attitude, some sort of faith,
toward things, to supply a background, a justification of our be-
havior. Even the most unphilosophical, the most unlettered, or the
most skeptical person has some sort of philosophy, conscious or un-
conscious, whether he admits it or not. In his conduct out in the
world of life and action he acts a philosophy, though he may disdain
to acknowledge it. The most self-questioning scientist belies his
intellectual creed of accepting nothing without proof the moment
he forgets his studies, the moment he leaves his laboratory and goes
forth as a human being.
There are some individuals who prefer to have their philosophv
expressed in articulate, communicable form, rather than leave it
unconscious, vauge, and unverbalized. Such are we poor, misguided
individuals, who waste our time poring over books of philosophv,
who reach out for the unattainable, who seek to render ever more
complete, emotionally and intellectually satisfying, our IVeltaii-
schauung.
We revel in the fierce, exhilarating joy of the chase, though our
quarry ever eludes us, is ever a step beyond us. What hunter pur-
sues his prey for the mere business of filling his larder, and prefers
the disappointing satisfaction of capture to the wild, innervating
ecstasy of pursuit?
jMalebranche said, "If I held Truth captive in my hand, I should
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o])en my hand and lee it fly, in order that I might again pursue and
capture it." Philosophic Truth offers joy without end, is the one
l)lcasure which will not allow us to become blase, because of its
^ er\- uattainable nature.
As has already been hinted, science makes no claim to absolute
knowledge. It seeks theories, hypotheses, laws, and formulae such
that will enable us to predict and control phenomena, so that we
ma\- alter and reconstruct our experience and environment, making
this world a better place in which to live. From the scientific stand-
I»oint, the value of an item of knowledge lies in its fruits, and the
criterion of truth is usefulness. That which is true from this prag-
matic stand-point is that which enables us to attain a fuller and
more abundant living. Old truths are constantly giving way to new
and more adec}uate truths, which better fulfill that purpose in ex-
perience.
Let us carry the pragmatic motive into the field of the life of an
individual. A philosophy or a religion, is useful, or necessary, for
an individual to attain that abundant living, adjustment with his
environment, that harmonious functioning of all his capacities,
which are the aim of the individual's life. Hence, though we can-
not attain an ultimately true philosophy, we can shape and acquire a
practical and intellectually satisfying attitude toward life, that will
gi\e us those ideals that determine our character and our actions.
\\'e have dire need to-day for some such attitude toward life.
John Dewey has written well in this connection. 'AMiere is the
moral progress that corresponds to our economic accomplishments ?
The latter is the direct fruit of the revolution that has been wrought
in physical science. But where is there a corresponding human
science and art? Xot only has the improvement in the method of
knowing remained so far mainly limited to technical and economic
matters, but this progress has brought with it serious new moral
disturbances. It need only cite the late war, the problem of capital
and labor, the relation of economic classes, the fact that while the
new science has achieved wonders in medicine and surgery, it has
also produced and spread occasions for diseases and w^eaknesses.
These considerations indicate to us how undeveloped are our politics,
how crude and primitive our education, how passive and inert our
morals. The causes remain which brought philosophy into existence
as an attempt to find an intelligent substitute for blind custom and
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blind impulse as guides to life and conduct." (Reconstruction in
Philosophy, p. 123. Italics mine.)
Science, unallied with a program of ethical idealism, threatens
to wipe out civilization, through its perfecting of the efficiency of
instruments and destruction. W'e hear rumors of scientists at work,
in every world power, at the problems of chemical and even bac-
teriological warfare. Explosives have been developed of late that
make the explosives used in the last war seem like children's fire-
crackers. The next war will be fought from the air, and will be
directed against the civilian populations as well as against the armed
forces at the battle-front. With modern electrical, chemical, and
bacteriological methods of destruction civilization itself will be
jeopardized if another world-war occurs. Perhaps the human race
will render itself extinct through its useful slave, science, rising up
and slaying its master.
Would it not be better, for themselves and society, for these men
of science, devoting their energies to the means of destroying man-
kind's painfully, slowly, and laboriously acquired civilization, to
hold some religious, philosophical, or ethical view that would restrain
them from that diabolical work, even if that view could not be em-
pirically proved, than to be free from all dictates of conscience what-
ever through an ethically indifference agnosticism? Even a false
theory that furnishes a basis for ethically responsible conduct i>
certainly more conducive to the welfare of society than the lack of
any guiding theory whatever.
True science, as distinguished from the pseudo-science of certain
commercial scribblers, makes no claim that its results represent abso-
lute truth. A scientific "truth" is merely a concept abstracted from
the perceptual flux, to be used as an instrument in the control of
our environment. When a more efficient instrument is found, the
old "truth" is either discarded or revised. The results of science,
like the programs of a certain vaudeville theatre that I was once
dragged into by a friend, well-meaning, but in need of philosophv,
are "subject to change without notice."
If then the results of science are useful to us even if they do not
represent absolute truth, we can say the same of a philosophy of
life. If a scientific theory is "true" because of its useful applica-
tions, we may say with equal justification that a particular philoso-
phy of life is "true" because of its useful applications in the conduct
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of life. The argument that absolute truth is unknowable does not
invalidate philosophy anymore than it invalidates science. Philos-
ophy, when approached and studied in the right spirit, is as prac-
tical as science.
Decriers of philosophy are fond of alluding to the clash between
rival schools of philosophy. It is declared that the points on which
all philosophers are agreed would not fill a page of a pocket note-
book.
As to the matter of disagreement among philosophers, the very
nature of the problems investigated by philosophy precludes un-
animous results. Furthermore, philosophy does the pioneer work
in fields which are not yet ready for the exact methods of the special
sciences. A great part of the w-ork of philosophy consists of such
pre-scientific work. As soon as a field of research has reached the
point where scientific exactness is possible, that field automaticall\
ceases to be philosoph\' and becomes science. Thus science claims
credit for a great deal of accomplishment that really belong to
philosophy.
Again, scientists are not as universally agreed upon their results
as is commonly supposed. Take the theory of evolution for example.
While practically all scientists now accept the bare fact of evolution,
we find at least five conflicting theories of the modus operandi of
evolution. Lamarck, Darwin, \\'eismann, Eimer, and De \'ries ha\e
each given us a distinct theory of descent. The theory of natural
selection unaided by the inheritance of acquired characters, of \A'eis-
mann. has been losing ground of late before a revival of Lamarckian-
ism. Thus certain questions within the field of science are as far
from final solution as the questions of philosophy.
A\'hile there is no complete agreement among philosophers, still,
tendencies originated by certain philosophers persist and reappear
in the works of all later philosophers, often many centuries later.
Thus the Heraclitan idea of the harmony of opposites has played its
part in the philosophy of Hegel, twenty-two centuries later. Even
today a new philosophical tendency-movement, called the Xew
Heraclitanism, is under way.
Although, let us say Plato's philosophy as a whole is no longer
adequate, many of his views continue to play a role in modern
thought. Plato believed in a supernal, perfect, eternal world of
Ideas, divine models of things from w'hich earthly things derive
their imperfect, material existence, ^^'hile we no longer believe in
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the actual existence of the Ideas, the conception of them is still use-
ful to us, as ideals towards which we may direct our efforts.
Anaximander and Empedocles, the Ancient Greek philosophers,
had evolution theories. Anaximander taught that all things had
their origin in a fiery vapor, the apeiron; that living creatures came
from the slime; and that man evolved from water creatures. We
have here the modern naturalistic view of the world.
Empedocles taught a doctrine amazingly like the theory of
natural selection. According to this fertile imagination, four simple
elements, air, water, earth, and fire, through the operation of two
fundamental forces, love and hate, were sufficient to the explain the
eternal fiux of integration and disintegration. A vast number of
combinations of the simple elements were formed in the past, but
only the more stable ones, those that could successfully survive the
conditions of the environment, remained. Such monstrosities as
headless men, lions with woman's heads, had come into existence
from time to time, only to perish in the struggle for life. We have
here a very fanciful, but unmistakable statement of the theory of
natural selection.
The idea of evolution thus was not an innovation of Lamarck,
or Goethe, or Darwin, but had been floating as a seed through the
ages, finally to land on the favorable soil of the nineteenth century.
Some of the philosophical speculations of twenty-five centuries ago
thus still appear in our science and philosophy, though with a new
significance. The statement that nothing is ever accomplished in
philosophy is obviously false.
Man in his early attempts at philosophizing is naive, and sees
greater simplicity and order in Nature than there really is. As
philosophy advances, the simple, unqualified formulae of the pio-
neers become antiquated and displaced by more subtle and elaborate
interpretations. Greater and greater becomes the range of phenom-
ena, the extent of the known universe, the discordant elements to be
resolved to a more and more embracing formula. As science and
human observation, aided by increasingly efifective instrumental
apparatus, expand, more and more things undreamt of in philosophy
—that is, the current philosophy—arise, and philosophy must expand
to take account of the new factors.
Philosophy, like science, is thus constantly correcting and re-
vising itself, so that the lack of permanent achievement in philosophy
is more apparent than real.
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The quest of truth is like Achihes' pursuit of the tortoise in the
celebrated paradox of Eleatic Zeno ; strive as we may, the ultimate
truth can never be attained, for like the tortoise, it is more and more
nearly reached, but never over-taken.
The world-view, or JVelfa)ischaiiu)ig, of any particular age may
be likened unto a musical chord with discordant elements included,
a chord of the seventh or the ninth, as it were. With further progress
of philosophy these discordant elements resolve into a consonance,
but in the meanwhile new discordant elements have entered, through
the discovery of new problems, to resolved in the next step forward.
Thus the progression of chords never comes to a final concord, but is
rather a sequence of discords, such as the sequences of chords of
the seventh or the ninth which we often hear in music, each chord
ever resolving into the chord following.
The end of the sequence, the final philosophy, would be the con-
templation of the perfect, concluding tonic chord of the cosmic sym-
phon}'. the evolution of the cosmos brought to its final, infinitely
distant ideal; the world pi'ocess regarded sub specie aefcniifafis,
past, present, and future blended into one glorious, diaphanous, ever-
lasting present moment, in the consciousness of some all-knowing
mind.
